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Dysfunctional Audit Behaviour: An Exploratory Study in Malaysia
ABSTRACT

Purpose The quality of the opinion provided by audit firms is an important determinant
of their long-term survival, but audit quality is difficult to gauge, which makes it
particularly sensitive to the behaviour of the individuals who carry on audit work. This
study seeks to identify the incidence of Dysfunctional Audit Behaviours and Audit
Quality Reduction Behaviours, actions taken by an auditor during engagement that
reduce evidence-gathering effectiveness.
Design/methodology /approach The study is based on a survey of 244 auditors working
in small/medium and big audit firms in Malaysia.
Findings The study identified key variables leading to dysfunctional audit behaviour.
Research limitations/implications The study is subject to the normal limitations
associated with survey research.
Practical implications The study provides basic empirical evidence of a potentially
serious risk of dysfunctional behaviours that may impair audit quality.
Originality/value The study provides empirical evidence to address the concerns of the
Malaysian regulatory authorities regarding audit quality.
Keywords audit behaviour; audit quality; audit risk; dysfunctional behaviour
Paper type Research paper
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1.0 Introduction

The purpose of this study is to explore the incidence of dysfunctional audit behaviour,
specifically pre-mature sign off (PMSO), specific audit quality reduction behaviour
(AQRB) and the effect of time budget pressure, which is one of the key operational and
management control mechanisms in an audit assignment. Auditors generally perceive that
their performance evaluation and career advancement in an audit firm are strongly related
to their ability to complete an audit assignment on time and within the budget. At the
same time, they are also expected to accomplish audit tasks to enable the formulation of
an opinion in accordance to relevance auditing standards and guidelines. The results of a
number studies show that time budgets are difficult to attain and this can affect audit
quality (Kelley and Margheim, 1990; Cook and Kelley, 1988; Dalton and Kelley, 1997).

2.0 Audit Quality and Time Budget Pressure

Audit quality has been defined in numerous ways. The practitioner literature often
defines audit quality relative to the degree to which the audit conforms to applicable
auditing standards (Watkins et al., 2004). Some empirical audit quality research
(DeAngelo, 1981; Wooten, 2003) defines audit quality relative to audit risk which is the
risk that an auditor may fail to modify the opinion on financial statements that are
materially misstated. DeAngelo (1981) defines audit quality as ‘the market-assessed joint
probability that a given auditor will both (a) discover a breach in the client’s accounting
system, and (b) report the breach’. At the heart of audit is a tension between cost and
quality (McNair, 1991). The long run sustainability of the profession depends upon the
perceived quality of audit as a product and the maintenance of its reputation demands
investment of time and high calibre of staff in audit work (Watkins et al., 2004; Wilson
and Grimlund, 1990). The dilemma is intensified by the fact that audit quality is by
nature difficult to observe and measure.
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Since the quality of the audit cannot readily be evaluated, reputation therefore acts as a
surrogate for quality. The market place for audit services has become increasingly
competitive and audit fees have fallen considerably. Beattie and Fearnley (1994)
concluded that there is significant downward pressure on audit fees generally, and
particularly large reductions in fees when audits are put to tender. Faced with this
situation, audit firms are under pressure to decrease man-hours in order to keep margins
at an acceptable level. These competitive pressures may result in quality compromises
which are not detectable in the short term by either clients or audit firm management.
This places a particularly heavy burden on an audit firm’s control systems, in that very
tight cost control needs to be achieved in a manner which does not reduce audit quality.
Margheim and Pany (1986) revealed that tight budgets often lead auditors to omit parts of
the audit program, thus leading to lower audit quality. A subsequent survey by Kelley and
Margheim (1990) highlighted similar findings. Coram et al (2003) suggested that the
level of time budget pressure impacts on the propensity to compromise audit quality and
found that under such pressure auditors do consider the level of risk to the audit task
whilst executing the audit.

3.0 Dysfunctional Behaviour
Dysfunctional behaviour has its origins in Argyris’ (1952) seminal case-study oriented
paper. This term describes the “...organisational and behavioural effects seen in
supervisors induced by the use of budgeting” (Hartmann, 2000) and refers to the
violation of control system rules and procedures (Jaworski and Young, 1992). Hartmann
(2000) contends that dysfunctional behaviour is not just an ‘irrational’ human tendency,
but rather reactions that can be ‘rationally’ expected in response to controls and
processes. The extent to which such controls are perceived to impact on performance,
evaluation and rewards, is also viewed as having an impact on managerial stress and
tension, thus leading to potential dysfunctional behaviour.
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Certain actions of auditors that result in substandard audits have been termed as
dysfunctional audit behaviours. Dysfunctional behaviour has also been referred to as
reduced audit quality behaviour (Otley and Pierce, 1996; Coram et al., 2003). A variety
of these cover behaviour such as failure to research an accounting principle, pre-mature
sign off (PMSO) of audit procedures, superficial review of documents, acceptance of
weak client explanations and reduction of work on an audit step below the acceptable
level. These behaviours may pose a direct threat to the quality of the audit.

A second form of dysfunctional behaviour is underreporting of the actual time (URT)
spent on specific auditing tasks (Donnelly et al., 2003). This occurs when auditors
complete chargeable work on their own time and is usually motivated by a desire to avoid
or minimise budget over-runs (Lightner et al., 1982). Although this type of behaviour
does not pose an immediate threat to audit quality, it may lead to undesirable
consequences such as inaccurate staff evaluations, lost revenue for the firm, unrealistic
future budgets and dysfunctional audit behaviour on future audits.

Several studies have surveyed auditors about their perceptions of and participation in
different types of dysfunctional audit behaviour. Rhode (1977) found 55 percent of
experienced auditors (i.e., greater than three years experience) surveyed and Lightner et
al. (1982) found 67 percent of the Big 8 auditors surveyed admitted to URT. Rhode
(1977) also found 60 percent of experienced auditors had pre-maturely signed off on an
audit step without actually performing it, while Alderman and Deitrick (1982) found 31
percent of the Big 8 auditors surveyed acknowledged that PMSO occurs in practice. More
generally, Willett and Page (1996) found that only 22 percent of the finalists taking the
Institute of Chartered Accountants examination in England and Wales stated that they
had never participated in speeding up of audit testing by irregular methods and Coram et
al. (2003) found that almost two-thirds of Australian respondents had ‘sometimes’
performed reduced audit quality practices. Kelley and Margheim (1990) found over onehalf of the auditors surveyed stated that they had engaged in dysfunctional audit
behaviours on a recent audit.
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4.0 Research Questions

4.1 Pre-mature Sign-Off (PMSO)
A significant part of the literature on reduced audit quality has focused on PMSO as one
primary type of reduced audit quality behaviour (Rhode, 1977; Alderman and Deitrick,
1982; Margheim and Pany, 1986; Otley and Pierce, 1996; Pierce and Sweeney, 2005).
The most common aspects identified in the literature have included rejecting awkward
items from a sample and accepting doubtful audit evidence. PMSO occurs when the
auditors signs off a required audit step, not covered by an alternative audit step, without
actually completing the work or noting the omission (Otley and Pierce, 1996). Previous
studies identified time pressures as one of the significant reasons for PMSO. The
consequences of this behaviour are potentially serious, since it interferes directly with the
control systems which support the final audit opinion.

The specific questions addressed in this study on PMSO are:
Research Question 1: Whether Malaysian auditors have engaged in PMSO?
Research Question 2: What are the audits areas in which these behaviours are
most prevalent?
Research Question 3: What are the variables leading to PMSO?

4.2 Audit Quality Reduction Behaviour (AQRB)
AQRB refers to a number of specific behaviours, in addition to PMSO, which directly
threaten audit quality, such as accepting weak client explanations and making only a
superficial review of documents. Research Question 4 on AQRB is addressed in this
study: During the year, how often have auditors engaged in specific AQRB when
carrying out an audit?

The survey questionnaire listed four specific types of AQRB examined by Kelley and
Margheim (1990) and Otley and Pierce (1996). The purpose of this study is to assess the
existence of such dysfunctional behaviour among the different levels of audit personnel.
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4.3 Time Budget Pressure and Under Reporting of Time (URT)

Time budget pressure refers to those time constraints that arise or may arise, in
engagements from limitations of resources (time) allocated to perform tasks (De Zoort
and Lord, 1997). Normally audit firms communicate these limitations to audit personnel
through time budgets. Research shows that time budgets have the potential to create
pressure because these budgets act not only as a control mechanism but also as a
performance measurement tools within the firm. The results of a number studies show
that time budgets are difficult to attain and this can affect audit quality (Kelley and
Margheim, 1990; Cook and Kelley, 1998; Dalton and Kelley, 1997). Also, some studies
show that auditors believe this pressure is escalating (Waggoner and Cashell, 1991; Otley
and Pierce, 1996). In contrast, a more recent study has shown that time budgets are
becoming more realistic (Buchheit et al., 2003).
URT arises when an auditor carries out chargeable work and does not charge it to the
client for whom the work has been done. Although this behaviour does not immediately
affect audit quality, it does result in artificially low time records and it may lead to
undesirable consequences such as inaccurate staff evaluations, lost revenue for the firm,
unrealistic future budgets and audit quality reduction behaviour on future audits. URT is
likely to lead to very tight time budgets, which previous studies (Alderman and Deitrick,
1982; Otley and Pierce, 1996) have highlighted as being a major cause of dysfunctional
behaviour but need not necessarily lead to a reduction in audit quality. As the ability to
meet time budgets was considered a ‘very important’ factor affecting advancement and
performance evaluation in the audit firms, URT has become a relatively easy strategy for
auditors (Rhode, 1977; Lightner et al., 1982; Pierce and Sweeney, 2005).

The auditors were given six options to choose from, these could be classified as
functional responses (request and obtain budget increases and work harder but charge all
time properly) and dysfunctional responses (URT by working on personal time, shift time
to non-chargeable code, reduce the quality of audit work to meet budget and shift time to
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a different client. These responses allowed two further research questions to be
addressed:
Research Question 5: Do time-budget pressures cause audit personnel to engage in
dysfunctional behaviour? and,
Research Question 6: Do time budget pressures cause the under-reporting of
engagement time?

5.0 Data Collection

Participants for this exploratory study are Malaysian auditors in public practice. A
random sample of 244 auditors was obtained from the audit firms listed with the
Malaysian Institute of Accountants (MIA). The 244 auditors comprised 131 audit staff;
18 audit seniors; 80 audit managers and 15 partners of firms, ranging from small and
medium size to the ‘Big 4’ firms. A questionnaire was developed from the original
version of Otley and Pierce (1996) and was distributed late in 2007.

6.0 Results and Discussion

The analysis and discussion of the results are structured around the answers to the six
research questions specified above. Thus the responses relating to Research Question 1
allows us to conclude that a PMSO problem exists, with 57 percent of respondents
admitting to signing-off prematurely.
Data from Table 1 address Research Question 2, and indicates that the incidence of
PMSO is most common in the review/testing of the Internal Control System (ICS),
followed by PMSO at the time of vouching of expenses. The same two areas were
highlighted by Alderman and Deitrick (1982) and Otley and Pierce (1996). ANOVA
analysis revealed that these two areas had a significantly greater likelihood of PMSO than
other major areas of the audit (F=82.16; p=.000). These same two areas are expected to
have a higher incidence of PMSO because of the relatively small amount of working
paper documentation involved (Alderman and Deitrick, 1982). Besides, the
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review/testing of ICS and vouching and expenses are concerned only with the existence
and completeness of transaction on audit assertions and objectives. In addition, the
auditor can use the previous year’s recorded understanding and assessment of ICS.

By comparison, Raghunathan’s (1991) US study, found that PMSO are perceived as most
likely to occur during the analytical review stage, followed by PMSO at the time of
checking the internal auditor’s work and supervision of the work of subordinates. Again,
as expected the least likely areas of PMSO incidence are cash, accounts receivable and
account payable. These three accounts are interrelated by cash, as cash is involved in cash
sales, credit sales (receivables) and cash payments (payable). These are the critical areas
of audit where auditors have to obtain sufficient and appropriate evidence about each
significant assertion for the applicable transactions and balances. All assertion categories
need to be confirmed at the audit working paper stage. The high levels of working papers
prepared for these areas explain why they are the least likely to be subject to PMSO.
Auditors have to use various combinations of tests of control and substantive procedures
in order to meet all assertion categories in these accounts: existence or occurrence,
completeness, rights and obligations, valuation or measurement and disclosure.

Participants were then presented with a list of possible causes of PMSO, based on
Alderman and Deitrick (1982) and Otley and Pierce (1996). The perceived importance of
these possible causes, ranked in descending order, is shown in Table 2. Budget
constraints and the perceived necessity of an audit step have been highlighted as major
causes of PMSO and dysfunctional audit behaviour, thus providing an answer to
Research Question 3.

9

Table 1
Perceived PMSO in Areas of Audit
Area

Mean

SD

Score

% of Respondents who
reported that PMSO occur
at least sometimes

Review/testing ICS

3.24

1.11

78

Vouching of expenses

3.25

1.12

75

Other Inventory

2.41

0.85

43

Fixed Assets

2.26

0.83

38

Physical Inventory Count

2.19

0.83

32

Accounts Payable

2.09

0.68

24

Accounts Receivable

2.10

0.65

23

Cash

1.89

1.76

16

Table 2
Perceived Importance of the Causes of PMSO

Perceived Cause

Mean Score

SD

An audit step appearing unnecessary/immaterial

4.05

1.12

Time budget constraint

3.83

1.01

Client imposed deadline

3.57

1.07

Inclination to readily accept client explanations

3.01

1.02
10

Inadequate supervision

2.83

0.94

Desire to obtain a favourable evaluation

2.83

1.27

Dislike for the work required

2.70

1.09

Misunderstanding of professional responsibilities

2.69

1.01

Lack of technical knowledge

2.53

0.95

Respondents were asked to indicate the frequency of each of the specific AQRB within
the last year practices. Their responses are listed in Table 3 and all responses are close to
2 (i.e., the ‘rarely’ category), indicating that none of the individual behaviours are
widespread. However, of some concern is the fact that 72 percent of all respondents
admitted to engaging in one or more of the specified behaviours, at least ‘sometimes’.

Table 3
Frequency of Specific Audit Quality reduction Behaviour (AQRB)

AQRB Behaviour

Mean Score

SD

Made superficial reviews of documents

2.24

0.89

Accepted weak explanations from client

2.15

0.86

Reduced amount of work below level considered reasonable

2.09

1.10

Failed to research an accounting principle

1.91

0.84

A summary of the results presented in Table 4 addresses Research Questions 5 and 6.
Ranking based on mean scores showed that the most likely response to a tight budget is
to ‘work harder but charge all time properly’, followed by URT by working on personal
time and quality reduction of audit work in meeting budget.

Table 5 presents the comparison of results of the present study with those of Kelley and
Seiler (1982) and Otley and Pierce (1996). This comparison provides some evidence that
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auditors are less likely to request and obtain an increase in their budgets. ‘Work harder
but charge all time properly’ is the most common response. ‘Reduce the quality of work
to meet budget’ is reported higher for the present study compared to those reported in the
US by Kelley and Seiler (1982). In comparison, Malaysian auditors are more likely to
engage in dysfunctional behaviour involving ‘quality reduction of audit work to meet
budget’ than their Irish counterparts from Otley and Pierce (1996).

Table 4
Responses to Tight Budget

Response to Tight Budget

Mean Score

SD

Work harder but charge all time properly

3.31

1.16

URT by working on personal time

2.82

1.43

Reduce the quality of audit work to meet budget

2.41

1.20

Request and obtain an increase in the budget

2.16

1.10

Shift time to a non-chargeable code

2.16

1.08

Shift time to a different client

1.51

0.75

Table 5
Responses to Tight Budget: Comparison of Study
Response to Tight Budget

Kelley and

Otley and

This

Seiler

Pierce

Study

(1982)

(1996)

- US Study

- Irish Study

Work harder but charge all time properly

90%

75%

81%

URT by working on personal time

33%

54%

42%

Reduce the quality of audit work to meet

10%

36%

40%

Request and obtain an increase in the budget

57%

36%

43%

Shift time to a non-chargeable code

19%

40%

29%

budget
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Figures 1 and 2 show the breakdown of participants’ responses to tight budgets or time
budget pressures by position and by type of firm (Big 4 and non-Big 4). Figure 1 shows
functional responses and Figure 2 shows dysfunctional responses. Partners and Managers
(P&M) i.e. auditors holding higher-ranks, as well as auditors holding lower-ranks i.e.
Staffs and Seniors (S&S), both appear to resort to functional and dysfunctional means in
coping with pressure

Figure 1: Responses to budget pressure by type of firm and type of position
-

Functional responses

Request and obtain budget increases

28

%

48

48
37

10

16

13

48

32

40

52

47

Non Big
Firm - S&S

Total - S&S

38

37

42
25

Big Firm P&M

24

25

Non Big
Firm - P&M

Total - P&M

Big Firm S&S
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Work harder but charge all time properly

28

33
48

52

45

%

69
48

45
34

32

38

19
24

18

Non Big
Firm - P&M

Total - P&M

12
Big Firm P&M

Rarely

18
Big Firm S&S

Sometimes

16

17

Non Big
Firm - S&S

Total S&S

Often

Notes to Figure 1:
Participants responded to a Likert-type scale of 1 to 5 (1= never; 2=rarely;
3=sometimes; 4=often; 5=nearly always). In this figure, the two responses i.e.
never and rarely are classified as ‘Rarely’ and often and nearly always as ‘Often’.
Figure 1 shows about a third of the partners and managers (for both ‘big 4’ and non-big 4
firms i.e. 38%) requested and obtained budget increases often, only 13% of the auditors
holding lower-ranks tend to do so (for both big and non-big firm). This may indicate that
those holding lower-rank positions are reluctant to come forward with budget increase
requests. The responses of the two groups (P&M and S&S) are significant at the 0.01
level, where auditors in P&M group admitted making requests for budget increases more
often than S&S. This is consistent with an expectation on the part of managers and
partners that they will succeed in obtaining budget changes, while staff and seniors may
be less successful. Respondents for both groups also indicated that they often worked
harder and charged all time properly when faced with stricter time budgets. This is
evident from 48% for P&M group and 45% for S&S group (i.e., no statistically
significant difference between the two user groups).
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Figure 2 illustrates the responses on dysfunctional behaviour. Both groups resort to some
dysfunctional activity to cope with time budget pressure. For example, 25%, 32% and
30% of P&M group, at least sometimes, tend to URT either by working in personal time,
by shifting time to non-chargeable or by shifting time to different client respectively.
Whereas for the S&S group at 22%, 35% and 34% on the same dysfunctional responses.
These high percentages may be construed as a warning that URT is a common practice
among auditors at all levels in Malaysia. This tendency might be a strategy for avoiding
budget over-runs by the S&S group. Auditors at the lower-ranks (S&S) also tended to
reduce the quality of audit work when faced with the tight time budgets. This is evident
from Figure 2 as many auditors indicated, at least sometimes, responding to tight budgets
by reducing the quality of audit work i.e. Partners/Managers at 7% and Seniors/Staffs at
23% (Often at 7%). Accordingly, audit personnel holding relatively lower ranks (S&S)
are sometimes responding to time budget pressure with extreme measures. The responses
of the two groups (P&M and S&S) are significantly different here at the 0.05 level, with
auditors in S&S group admitting to undertaking quality reduction acts.
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Figure 2: Responses to budget pressure by type of firm and type of position
- Dysfunctional responses
Under-reporting of Time (URT) by working on personal time
17

25

22

20

25

31

13

11
42

25

22

%

30
67

64
41

Big Firm Non Big
P&M
Firm - P&M

53

53
39

Total - P&M

Big Firm S&S

Non Big
Firm - S&S

Total S&S

Reduce the quality of audit work
0
8

0
6

0
7

6

8
13

32

%
92

94

79

Non Big
Firm - P&M

23

93
62

Big Firm P&M

7

Total - P&M

Big Firm S&S

Non Big
Firm - S&S

70

Total S&S
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Figure 2 continued
Shift time to non-chargeable code
7

8

7

35

28

32

10

14

26

35

%

44

12

58

64

61

60
46

Big Firm P&M

Non Big
Firm - P&M

Total - P&M

Big Firm S&S

Non Big
Firm - S&S

53

Total S&S

Shift time to a different client
6

12

12

12

32

28

30

56

60

58

Non Big
Firm - P&M

Total - P&M

11

26

34

58

55

Non Big
Firm - S&S

Total S&S

%

42

16

Big Firm P&M

Rarely

52

Big Firm S&S

Sometimes

Often

Notes to Figure 2:
Participants responded to a Likert-type scale of 1 to 5 (1= never; 2=rarely;
3=sometimes; 4=often; 5=nearly always). In this figure, the two responses i.e.
never and rarely are classified as ‘Rarely’ and often and nearly always as ‘Often’.
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As budget attainability or achievement is significantly positively related to performance
evaluation (Kelley and Seiler, 1982; Cook and Kelley, 1988; Otley and Pierce, 1996),
respondents were asked direct questions on the perceived importance of budget
achievement in the overall evaluation of performance. There was evidence that budget
achievement is seen by many respondents as being critical for a successful career in
auditing. They were asked how important time budget achievement is in the overall
evaluation of performance (Perceived), and their opinion of how important time budget
achievement should be (Desired). Responses for Audit Managers are summarised in
Table 6 :

Table 6
Importance of Budget Achievement in the Evaluation of
Audit Manager’s Performance
Perceived

Desired

Very Important

38.3%

8.3%

Quite Important

33.2%

31%

Of Some Importance

26.3%

52%

Of Little Importance

4.6%

7.6%

Of No Importance

1.2%

1.1%

Table 6 indicates a strong feeling that budget achievement is given too much importance
in the overall evaluation of performance. It is observed that time budgets are perceived to
be ‘very important’ to ‘quite important’ (71.5% and 26.3% of respondents selected ‘of
some importance’). Surprisingly, when desired importance of budget achievement in the
overall evaluation of performance is measured, half of the respondents observed a lower
level of importance i.e. ‘of some importance’. There seems to be a general acceptance
that a certain amount of budget pressure is an unavoidable fact of life in auditing firms.
Managers felt that, ideally, budget achievement should be ‘of some importance’ with
respect to their performance evaluation.
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Respondents’ perceptions on the attainability of their budgets in the last year are shown
in Table 7. More than half of all respondents believed that last year’s time budget were
either difficult to attain or unattainable. Table 7 and Table 8 (for comparative studies)
indicate that more than half of respondents considered their time budget to be
unattainable or difficult to attain. Accordingly, Malaysian auditors considered their time
budget to be ‘unattainable’ to a slightly higher degree than their Irish and New Zealand
counterparts, but lower at a ‘difficult to attain’ degree, i.e., 32% as compared to Irish
(58.1%) and New Zealand (50%).

Table 7
Perceived Budget Attainability
Response

% of Respondents

Attainable

29.8%

Difficult to Attain

32%

Unattainable

38.2%

Table 8
Perceived Budget Attainability: Comparison of Study

Response

Attainable
Difficult to Attain
Unattainable

This Study

Otley and
Pierce (1996)
- Irish Study

Liyanarachchi and
McNamara
(2007)
- New Zealand Study

29.8%
32%
38.2%

25.4%
58.1%
16.5%

31%
50%
19%
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7.0 Conclusions

The study yields persuasive empirical evidence of the existence of dysfunctional
behaviour involving PMSO, specific AQRB and some aspects of URT and time budget
pressure. The study also produced important findings in relation to auditor’s control
system on time budget and budget emphasis. In general, many auditors in Malaysia think
that time budgets are difficult to attain. Auditors seem to resort to practices such as URT
and shifting to non-chargeable code and different client when faced with time budget
pressure. The variations in the perceived levels of PMSO across different areas of audit is
also a notable result as it would enable peer reviewers and practice reviewers to focus on
key areas with higher probabilities of PMSO.
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